Case law

C v North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust (2014): induction of labour, Prostin and reasonable clinical judgment

Whether a midwife was negligent in administering a second dose of Prostin during labour induction, examining the application of Bolam and Bolitho principles, clinical guidelines, risk assessment and the range of reasonable professional responses.

Published 1 January 2019 3 min read

Clinical Negligence · Obstetrics · Standard of Care



C v North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust

[2014] EWHC 61 (QB)
High Court, Queen’s Bench Division
Mr Justice Green
Judgment delivered: 23 January 2014


Background

The claimant suffered severe hypoxic brain injury following a catastrophic uterine rupture during induced labour. His mother died following negligent post-natal management, liability for which had already been admitted. The remaining issue was whether a midwife acted negligently by administering a second 3mg dose of Prostin approximately seven and a half hours after the first dose during the induction process.

It was common ground that the uterine rupture caused the baby’s hypoxic injury. The dispute centred solely upon whether the administration of the second dose fell below the standard expected of a reasonably competent midwife.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the claim and held that the administration of the second dose of Prostin was not negligent.

1. Professional negligence and clinical judgment

Applying Bolam and Bolitho, the court held that the relevant question was whether no reasonably competent midwife would have acted as the treating midwife had done.

The existence of an alternative, more cautious approach did not establish negligence. Clinical decisions often permit a range of reasonable responses.

2. The court’s role in evaluating expert evidence

While substantial weight is given to responsible expert opinion, the court must independently assess whether that opinion is logical, reasonable and consistent with the evidence.

Mr Justice Green emphasised that judges must not delegate the determination of the standard of care to expert witnesses, even where the experts are highly experienced and acting in good faith.

3. Guidelines are important but not conclusive

The midwife’s actions complied with the applicable Data Sheet and British National Formulary guidance, which permitted a second dose after 6-8 hours if labour had not become established.

Compliance with recognised guidance created a strong indication that the decision was reasonable, although the court accepted that adherence to guidelines alone does not automatically defeat a negligence claim.

4. Risk assessment must be judged prospectively

The risk of uterine rupture in an unscarred uterus was extremely low, estimated at approximately 1 in 17,000-20,000 deliveries.

The court stressed that risk assessment must be conducted based on what was known at the time of the decision, not in light of the catastrophic outcome that subsequently occurred.

5. No obligation to adopt the most cautious approach

The claimant’s experts argued that any indication that labour might be commencing should have led to withholding or delaying a second dose.

The court accepted that such an approach would have been reasonable but rejected the proposition that it was the only reasonable approach. The law does not require clinicians to choose the most cautious available option.

6. No negligence in failing to seek senior advice

On the clinical information available at the time, the midwife was entitled to conclude that labour had not become established and that there were no significant contraindications to a second dose.

Accordingly, she was not negligent in failing to seek the registrar’s opinion before administering the drug.

Outcome

The court concluded that the midwife’s decision fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. Although a more cautious practitioner might have delayed or withheld the second dose, the decision to administer it was compatible with accepted clinical practice, complied with prevailing guidance, and was supported by responsible expert opinion. The claim was therefore dismissed.